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Introduction
The sale of unique art objects at auction has changed dramatically
over the past thirty years. Auction houses have grown from wholesale
suppliers for art dealers to huge, multinational concerns that market art
directly to the public. As the character of auction houses has changed,
the traditional agency and sales rules governing auctions have become
increasingly inadequate.
At one time, the auctioneer's duty to his principal, the consignor of
the goods, was the most important of his duties. Today, the auctioneer's
duties extend not only to the consignor, but also to shareholders, bidders
at auction, and the public. Laws regulating auctioneers have arisen from
numerous sources outside of agency law. For the most part, they derive
from basic societal assumptions about the auction process and what it
should aspire to be. They rely on a fundamental vision of the auction as
a unique market with the ability to generate uniquely optimal prices for
its participants if it operates smoothly.
Part I of this Article will focus on these societal assumptions as the
groundwork for the rules that govern auctioneers. It will then summa-
rize the legal duties of auctioneers as agents and sellers in the market-
place. Part II will examine the traditional agency relationship between
auctioneer and seller. Part III will address newer doctrines governing an
auctioneer's behavior toward bidders. Part IV will explore the auction-
eer's emerging role as provider of a public function. Part V will discuss
some of the controversial practices of large, modern art auction houses,
including secret reserves, loans to buyers, buyer's premiums, and guaran-
teed prices. These practices conflict with both the current laws gov-
erning auctioneers and the basic assumptions from which they derive.
Part VI will address the criticisms identified in Part V and proposes
a series of rules for regulating the auction industry response to current
criticism of auction practices. These rules, based on the underlying soci-
etal assumptions about auctioneers, can serve as a model code of conduct
for auctioneers. They provide, in short, that
1. Secret reserve prices are permissible;
2. The auctioneer may enter protective bids up to the reserve price;
3. The auctioneer may openly bid to purchase any lot, thus guaran-
teeing prices to the consignor;
4. The auction house may not engage in any practice that favors one
bidder over another; and
5. The auctioneer must disclose all transactions truthfully and
completely.
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I
Assumptions Underlying the Auction Process
Until the past century, an auctioneer was regarded primarily as an
agent of his consignor. As such, he was governed by the rules of agency.'
Today, however, the rules of agency are insufficient to describe the many
legal relationships and obligations in which the art auctioneer is in-
volved.2 He has duties, not only to his consignor, but also to the bidders
at the auction, his own shareholders, and the general public. These new
duties have been inspired by sources as varied as the law of sales, con-
sumer protection law, and corporate law. In effect, this diversity means
that no single, explicit, legal theory underlies the regulations governing
auctioneers.
Society does, however, have assumptions about auctions and auc-
tioneers that create a consistent foundation for these new rules; a fabric
that binds them together.3 These basic assumptions explain why certain
auction practices are tolerated and why others are sharply criticized. Ul-
timately, they are based on the modern notions of fairness, efficiency, and
competition that permeate all areas of the law. The auction of unique
objects, however, presents a distinct market setting in which many con-
ventional rules of conduct are inapplicable. The assumptions about auc-
tions, therefore, are somewhat special and deserve individual treatment.
Because these assumptions are based on fundamental societal
norms, they may seem to be mere statements of the obvious. Identifying
and stating them is, however, valuable. It allows us to refer to them
systematically during our analysis of particular auction practices. The
assumptions are summarized in the following discussion.
A. Assumption 1: Auctions Should Result in Optimal Prices for Goods
The advantage of the English auction procedure is its theoretical
effect of efficiently pricing goods. As Feldman suggests, "The buyer is
assured that he is paying only the smallest necessary increment over
1. See, e.g., L. DuBoFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 548-49 (1977) (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I comment e (1957)); R. LERNER & J. BRESSLER, ART LAW
- THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 151 (1989); see also
infra Part II.
2. See infra Part II(D).
3. Throughout this paper, the term "auction" means the English-style auction, which is
the primary means of auctioning art in the United States. In such an auction, bidding for a lot
begins at a low price, with bidders competing to increase their bids until one bidder is willing
to go higher than all the others. See generally 2 F. FELDMAN, S. WEIL & S. DUKE BIEDER-
MAN, ART LAW 182-84 (1986) [hereinafter ART LAW] (describing the various types of auc-
tions, where they are used, and to what effect).
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what a rival purchaser would be willing to pay. The seller is assured that
he is receiving the best price that anyone present is willing to pay."4
Though somewhat naive, these assertions form our basic view of
how the auction market should operate. Of course, the auction market
rarely works to price goods so optimally. Nonetheless, the rules we enact
to regulate it attempt to move the market in the direction suggested by
the ideal.
Assumption 1 postulates that the auction market optimally prices
goods at a level that is beneficial to both the buyer and the seller. It is
rooted in the fundamental values of perfect competition among buyers
and the smooth operation of a free market system. There are three corol-
laries related to the auctioneer's role in the achievement of the goal stated
in Assumption 1.
1. Assumption ]a: The Auctioneer Should Excite and Manage the Bidding
This assumption recognizes the auctioneer's essential function in the
auction process. The oldest and most enduring duty of an auctioneer is
that of obtaining the highest price for a consignor. It is necessary to
minimize the factors lowering the prices buyers are willing to pay for a
principal's goods. In effect, the auctioneer is responsible for achieving
the optimal prices of Assumption 1.
2. Assumption 1b: The Auctioneer Should Not Cause Buyers to Pay Too
Much for a Work
Of course, in exciting the bidding, the auctioneer should not deceive
the bidders by entering false bids that artificially raise prices. Such be-
havior is perceived as subversive of the price optimizing process.5 Popu-
lar notions of fair play and mistrust of any deceptive practice rebel
against any hint that an auctioneer is taking advantage of the audience.
If bidders suspect they are being tricked at the auction, they will be reluc-
tant to bid freely. Suspicion will then inhibit their bids and corrupt the
optimal pricing ideal of Assumption 1. Though the auctioneer is ex-
pected to be a showman of sorts, he is also expected to act with honesty
and impartiality.
4. Id. at 183. One of the great advantages of purchasing art at auction is that prices are
generally lower than they would be for comparable works purchased from art dealers. Art
dealers, in fact, purchase much of their art at auction, and necessarily mark it up for resale.
See S. NAIFEH, THE BARGAIN HUNTER'S GUIDE TO ART COLLECTING 73 (1982) ("By bid-
ding against dealers for the same object, the collector can avoid paying the dealer's markup -
ranging from 5 to 50 percent, depending on the cost of the item.").
5. However, the real effect of artificially inflating the bidding is not necessarily detrimen-
tal to the auction process. See infra Part III(B).
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This assumption places a ceiling on the optimal price of Assumption
1. The highest price that should be paid at an auction is the highest price
a bidder is willing to pay absent improper interference by the auctioneer.
3. Assumption lc: The Auctioneer Deserves a Commission for His Services
As noted in Art Law, "the auction house, in return for its expertise
in bringing the buyer and seller together, earns a relatively modest com-
mission without exposing itself to the normal hazards of the art trade."6
It is a deeply rooted assumption in our society that labor is remunerated
with money. The auctioneer receives as a commission a percentage of
the auction price of the objects sold, reinforcing the work ethic adage
that "greater labor brings greater profit."7
B. Assumption 2: A Work Should Not Be Sold for Less Than the
Consignor Is Willing to Receive
Implicit in this assumption are currents of contract offer and accept-
ance theory. There appears to be something wrong when the owner of a
painting is forced to part with it for less than he paid. Naturally, he
should not be forced to sell if no bidder is willing to pay an acceptable
price. Hence, society tolerates certain protections for the seller to insure
that this does not occur. This assumption places a floor on the optimal
price sought in Assumption 1. The lowest price that should be paid for a
work at auction is the lowest price that the seller is willing to receive.
C. Assumption 3: No Buyer Should Have an Unfair Advantage at the
Auction
Inherent in a free market is the notion that market participants
should play on a relatively level playing field. Objectionable factors that
could tilt the field improperly include leaks of information and special
privileges to certain buyers without the knowledge or consent of others.
When a market is perceived as a place for popular participation, favoring
certain participants is inconsistent with its nature. This assumption op-
erates visibly in the securities market. It makes the idea of "insider trad-
ing" repugnant to the public despite academic debate about the actual
harm of the practice.'
6. ART LAW, supra note 3, at 183.
7. Although the auctioneer's exertion in selling an inexpensive painting and an expensive
painting are probably similar, such considerations do not dilute the simplistic appeal of the
ideal that rewards come in proportion to labor.
8. See, e.g., R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 271 (1986) ("It is simply obvious to [many
people] that it is unfair for some investors (insiders and their tipees) to have preferential access
to information, and no more need be said.").
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D. Assumption 4: The Auctioneer Should Report the Events of Each
Auction Truthfully and Completely
Honesty is a deeply rooted societal value. Dishonesty in reporting,
either through the press or private publications, is viewed as wrong re-
gardless of the actual consequences of such dishonesty. Full disclosure is
also highly valued in modem business practice. Incomplete or mislead-
ing corporate disclosures are frequently construed as misrepresentations
by omission.
The falsification of auction records has a real market effect. It sub-
verts the operation of an efficient market by distorting views of price
trends and gives either sellers or buyers false hopes about their prospects.
Agency loyalty is not an assumption about auctions: None of these
assumptions imply a relationship of trust or loyalty between the auction-
eer and the seller. Although such a relationship is established by the
agency law principles that govern auctioneers, it is not native to the pop-
ular conception of the auctioneer or the auction process. Such loyalty is
surely not expected by the consignor, who must generally sign a long
contract full of disclaimers before the auctioneer will accept the goods.
Notions of trust and "utmost good faith," though popular with courts,
are not present in the popular image of this business relation. So long as
the auctioneer honestly and thoroughly performs his function as a price-
optimizer, the auction process will be viewed as functioning correctly.
II
The Auctioneer's Duty to the Seller
The most explicitly defined duty of an auctioneer is that of an obli-
gation to the consignor of goods for sale. An auctioneer who receives
goods on consignment from a seller becomes an agent of that seller in all
matters pertaining to the sale of the seller's goods. In addition to con-
tractual obligations, statutory and common law impose on the agent a
number of additional duties toward the principal. These include duties
of diligence, obedience, disclosure, accounting, and loyalty as a fiduciary.
The major duties required of auctioneers are summarized below.
A. Duty of Diligence
1. Obtaining the Best Price
An auctioneer is an agent retained for the purpose of selling the
principal's goods. As such, the auctioneer's primary duty is to obtain for
the principal the highest possible sale price for those goods.9 The auc-
9. See 7A C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 2 (1980). Although agency law dictates a
duty to obtain the highest price, such a duty is not one of the basic assumptions about auc-
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tioneer must do everything possible to counteract the bidders' reluctance
to bid higher. Such a counterbalancing upward pull on the price results
in the optimal pricing required by Assumption I (optimal price). In re-
turn, the auctioneer is entitled to a commission on the sale, as recognized
by Assumption Ic (commission). 10
a. Exciting the Bidding
An auctioneer is expected to excite the competition of bidding to
achieve the highest possible price." It is during the auction that the skill
and style of individual auctioneers can be used to the seller's advantage.
In exciting the bidding, the auctioneer has a great deal of discretionary
power. For example, he is responsible for determining the bidding incre-
ments. If too small, the bidding may proceed slowly and become bogged
down. If too large, bidders may be reluctant to jump up to a sufficiently
high price.
In addition to his verbal techniques, the auctioneer may alter the
auction procedure to produce higher bids. For example, he may tempo-
rarily postpone bidding on a lot' 2 if the bidding seems too low, or he may
even withdraw a lot from bidding."'
b. Advertising
In addition to exciting bidding during the auction, the auctioneer is
responsible for generating interest in a principal's goods before the auc-
tion. To do so, the auctioneer may distribute sale catalogs,14 advertise
upcoming auctions,' 5 and spread news by word of mouth.
tions. Selling a work for the highest possible price is in both the auctioneer's and the seller's
best interest. There is nothing remarkable about selling for a high price. The novelty and
value of the auction market lies in its ability to reflect an optimal price. Id.
10. Typically, art auctioneers receive 10% of the sale price from both the buyer and the
seller. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 199. In some cases, auctioneers will reduce the seller's
commission in order to attract a particularly lucrative client. For example, the seller's com-
mission negotiated by Cristallina, Inc. for the sale of eight Impressionist paintings was to be
only 4% of the sale price. See McGill, Sweeping Reassessment in the Auction Trade, N.Y.
Times, July 31, 1985, at C20, col. 3.
11. See Jones v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 334 F. Supp. 739, 743 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
12. A lot is an article or set of articles offered as an item for sale at an auction. WEB-
STER'S DICTIONARY, 586 (encyclopedic ed. 1987).
13. See Rapp v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 694, 698 (1983).
14. Sotheby's alone prints almost 400 catalogs each year, sending them to an estimated
75,000 subscribers. See Lee, Greed Is Not Just for Profit, FORBES, Apr. 18, 1988, at 65, 68.
15. The New York City Administrative Code restricts advertising "at or near any place
of sale, auction room, residence of any auctioneer, or at or near any auction whatsoever" to
signs or flags. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE, Title 20, Ch. 2, Subchapter 13, Reg. IV, § 25
[hereinafter N.Y. CODE], reprinted in R. LERNER & J. BRESSLER, supra note 1, at 195-96. It
is doubtful whether the major art auctioneers would be prone to use advertising means such as
sound trucks, but auction catalogs also seem to be excluded by this short list.
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Traditionally, the customers of art auctioneers were well-informed
art dealers who used auctioneers as wholesalers for their business
purchases.16 Today, however, the major auction houses tap directly into
the public market. As a result, much consumer legislation regulating
advertising has arisen. The New York Consumer Code, for example,
contains numerous provisions penalizing fraudulent or misrepresentative
advertising.17 Courts applying other consumer protection doctrines also
have little tolerance for dishonest advertising. In such cases, intent to
deceive is not necessary so long as a false advertisement has the capacity
to deceive a large portion of the public.18
2. Duty of Care
An agent is generally responsible for acting in conformity with the
care and skill required of a reasonable agent in the area and field of the
agency. 19
a. Areas of Special Expertise
An auctioneer often develops special expertise in the area of his
practice. If so, he may apprise sellers as to the expected prices and mar-
ketability of their goods. The ability to give such advice makes the serv-
ices of the auctioneer more valuable.
However, the provision of extra services and special skills imposes
extra duties on the auctioneer. When the auctioneer is hired because of
his special fitness for a particular job, he assumes an obligation to exer-
cise the care and skill of an expert in the field. He will no longer be held
liable only to the standards of an ordinary citizen,2° and the principal
will be justified in relying on the representations of such auctioneer as an
expert.21
b. Care of Property
An auctioneer generally receives temporary custody of the princi-
pal's property. While the property is in his custody, the auctioneer must
exercise ordinary care to ensure that it is not damaged or altered. The
16. See Lee, supra note 14, at 68.
17. See Cristallina v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 284, 296, 502
N.Y.S.2d 165, 174 (1986).
18. See Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 406-07, 759 P.2d 418,
423 (1988).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1984).
20. Cristallina, 117 A.D.2d at 293, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (Auctioneer "held to a standard
of care commensurate with the special skill which is the norm in the locality for that kind of
work."); see 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 217 (1986).
21. See Cristallina, 117 A.D.2d at 293, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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standard for an auctioneer's liability is that of ordinary negligence.22
Some legislation, however, refers to property held by an auctioneer on
consignment as "trust" property, implying a higher standard of care.2 3
B. Duty of Disclosure
An agent has an affirmative duty to use reasonable efforts to com-
municate to his principal "all material facts" that he has regarding the
subject matter of the agency and that might affect the seller's interest.24
This duty arises from a combination of Assumption 2 (floor price), which
protects the consignor from too low a price, and Assumption 1 (optimal
price), which accords the consignor the highest possible price. If an auc-
tioneer withholds information about the value of the works from a prin-
cipal, then the principal may not know what price to expect for the work.
He may set his minimum price unrealistically high, and prevent the work
from being sold, thwarting Assumption 1 (optimal price).
For example, in Cristallina v. Christie, Manson and Woods, Interna-
tional, Inc. ,2 the auction house failed to inform the principal that inter-
nal experts at Christie's disagreed over the "auction appeal" of the
paintings chosen for sale.26 When seven of his eight paintings failed to
sell, the principal claimed a breach of the duty to inform. He argued that
he could have avoided the poor sale by withdrawing the paintings had he
only been given the relevant information before the auction.27
The overriding importance placed on the auctioneer's duty to dis-
close is illustrated by Missouri ex rel. Jay Bee Stores, Inc. v. Edwards. 
28
Some of an auctioneer's records were necessary for the legal defense of
the principal in an unrelated controversy. The records, if revealed,
would have been financially damaging to the auctioneer. The court held
that the agency duty outweighed any personal interest of the auctioneer,
and forced it to produce the records.29
22. See 7A C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 23a (1980).
23. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFFs. LAW §§ 11.01.2, 12.01.1(a)(ii) (1991) (Section 11.01.2
defines "auctioneer" as an "art merchant," and Section 12.01.l(a)(ii) calls art delivered to an
art merchant for the purpose of sale on commission "trust property").
24. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D § 211 (1986); Eaddy v. Dorn, 289 S.C. 356, 345 S.E.2d 513 (Ct.
App. 1986) (Auctioneer did not inform his principal that the high bidder on a lot of land and
equipment was mentally defective and might be unable to pay for it. When the buyer defaulted
on the sales contract, the auctioneer was held liable for the sale price.); see also Cruishank v.
Horn, 386 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (auctioneer held liable for principal's funds
when he placed them in a bank that became insolvent without informing the principal of the
bank he was using).
25. 117 A.D.2d 284, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1986).
26. Id. at 292, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
27. Id. at 293, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
28. 636 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1982).
29. Id. at 63-64.
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C. Fiduciary Duty
In addition to the duties enumerated above, an agent owes to his
principal a general fiduciary duty. This duty is similar to that owed by a
trustee to a beneficiary, by a director of a corporation to its shareholders,
or by a professional to his or her clients.3" Often, the fiduciary relation-
ship is described as a duty of utmost good faith, honesty, and loyalty in
all matters relating to an agency.31
As mentioned above, the fiduciary duty of auctioneers to their con-
signors is not among the basic assumptions associated with the auction
process. The extent and power of the fiduciary bond attributed to auc-
tioneers might be relatively surprising and unintuitive to the layperson.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court established the importance of an agent's
loyalty in Wadsworth v. Adams, 32 stating that a principal "is entitled...
to the benefit of diligence, zeal, and disinterested exertions of the agent in
the execution of his employment. The law requires the strictest good
faith upon the part of one occupying a relationship of confidence to
another.,
33
Courts have traditionally viewed breaches of the fiduciary duty very
unfavorably. They have applied the rules governing fiduciaries "inexora-
bly" and "inflexibl[y]," often refusing to even consider evidence of exten-
uating circumstances affecting the agent.34 At stake, one court claimed,
is no less than "the safety of mankind.
'35
1. Self-Dealing Transactions
As in all agency and fiduciary relationships, there is an inherent sus-
picion associated with an agent acting for his own account while per-
forming the duties of his agency. Generally, the presumption runs
against the validity of any transaction between the principal and agent in
which the agent receives a benefit.36
An agent employed to sell the principal's goods may not become the
purchaser of those goods without the principal's express consent.37 Even
with the principal's consent, the agent is obliged to deal "fairly" with the
principal in any self-dealing transaction. The agent must not take advan-
30. See L. SMITH, G. ROBERSON, R. MANN & B. ROBERTS, BUSINESS LAW 352-53 (6th
ed. 1985).
31. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 210 (1986).
32. 138 U.S. 380 (1890).
33. Id. at 389.
34. R. DEAN, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 180 (1990).
35. Id. (quoting Parker v. McKenna, 10 Ch. App. 96 (1874) (per James, L.J.)).
36. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 210 (1986).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1984); see also L. SMITH, supra note
30, at 354.
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tage of a superior position to persuade the principal to make an improvi-
dent bargain. In the context of sales, the payment of a price lower than
fair market value for property from the principal is prima facie evidence
of an unfair transaction.38
In the context of auctions, it is a deeply grounded rule that the auc-
tioneer may not bid on or purchase the goods up for sale.39 The Supreme
Court warns against such behavior, stating that
[allowing] an auctioneer.., to bid off for himself the very property he
is selling... would give to the auctioneer many undue advantages. It
would tend, also, to weaken his fidelity in the execution of his duties
for the owner. He would be allowed to act in double and inconsistent
capacities. 4°
The prohibition on self-dealing for fiduciaries has been interpreted
very strictly in the context of estate trustees. Often, trustees are permit-
ted no benefit from the trust they administer. As the court in In re
Gleeson notes, "[t]he good faith and honesty of the petitioner or the fact
that the trust sustained no loss on account of his dealings therewith are
all matters which can avail petitioner nothing" when he benefitted from
the estate for which he was a trustee.4 1
However, the fiduciary doctrine has been loosened considerably
with respect to corporate directors engaging in self-dealing transactions
with their corporations.42 Since the nineteenth century flat prohibition
on self-dealing, the doctrine has evolved so that now most self-dealing
transactions will be permitted if "fair" or ratified by a majority of disin-
terested shareholders.43 Inasmuch as modern auction houses resemble
large corporations more than estate trustees, the fiduciary duty for auc-
tioneers should be similarly loosened.
2. Separation of Funds
The relationship between auctioneer and seller is also similar to that
of an estate trustee and a beneficiary in regard to the general rule that an
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 comment c (1984).
39. Combs v. Baker, 203 Ark. 602, 158 S.W.2d 48 (1942); see also Indiana Real Estate
Comm'n v. Meier, 244 Ind. 12, 17, 190 N.E.2d 191, 194 (1963). In this regard, auctioneers
differ from brokers, who may both buy and sell their principals' goods. See 7A C.J.S. Auctions
and Auctioneers § 2 (1980).
40. Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 134, 151-52 (1850).
41. In re Gleeson, 5 Ill. App. 2d 61, 66-67, 124 N.E.2d 624, 627 (1955) (The deceased had
leased a parcel of farm land to petitioner. When she died in 1952, he became the trustee of her
estate. He continued to lease the land until 1953, when he leased it to another tenant. The
court ordered him to pay all profits from the land during the period of his trusteeship to the
estate based on the general rule that a trustee cannot deal with the trust estate in his individual
capacity.).
42. See R. CLARK, supra note 8, at 160-69.
43. Id.
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auctioneer must maintain a separate account for the funds he receives for
the sale of his principal's property." The auctioneer may not, in other
words, commingle his own funds with those held for the principal.
3. Self-Defense
Another concept related to the prohibition on self-dealing is the no-
tion of self-defense. In a recent case, a district court decided that an
auctioneer could not charge its principal with the cost of defending itself
in a lawsuit when the auctioneer would have been adequately defended
by the principal's counsel. The court held that, "where the principal de-
fends itself, the agent is not eligible for indemnification unless the princi-
pal's defense leaves the agent's interest unprotected."'45
4. Competition with Principal
The fiduciary duty prevents an agent from competing with the prin-
cipal in any matter related to the agency.46 In the context of auctions,
such a situation could arise if the auctioneer offers goods that it owns and
that are similar to those it has on consignment from the principal. The
auctioneer's own goods would then be competing with the principal's for
buyers.
Moreover, the agent may not act on behalf of another party whose
interests conflict with those of the principal in the matter of the agency.47
This prohibition typically prevents the same agent from representing
both parties to a contract. The auctioneer, in representing both the buyer
and seller of goods, thus faces a potential conflict of interest.48
5. Secret Profits
While acting on the principal's behalf, the agent is forbidden from
receiving secret profits. All such profits rightfully belong to the princi-
pal.49 Courts have interpreted this restriction strictly, awarding the prin-
cipal all secret profits received by their agents, even if the profits exceed
the original contractual agreements. °
44. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 203 n.30 (Illinois has recently enacted a statute requir-
ing auctioneers to maintain special bank accounts for customer funds).
45. Basmajian v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 995, 999-1000
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
46. See Sierra Pacific Indus. v. Carter, 104 Cal. App. 3d 579, 581, 163 Cal. Rptr. 764, 766
(1980).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 (1957).
48. See infra Part III (A) (discussion of the auctioneer's double agency).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1957).
50. See Tamowsky v. Resop, 236 Minn. 33, 51 N.W.2d 801 (1952).
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D. Inadequacy of Agency Law
Agency law is rapidly becoming an inadequate doctrine for the gov-
ernance of large art auction houses. Principles of agency, developed in
the context of one-on-one relationships between masters and servants,
may be inherently inapplicable to the complex market inhabited by mod-
em auctioneers.
The auctioneer's obligations and liabilities to the bidder and to the
public have no place in his traditional agency relationship with the seller.
The number of regulations governing the auctioneer's behavior toward
others brings into question the strength of his duties toward the princi-
pal. In many cases, the rules imposed on the auction process harm the
consignor in order to benefit potential buyers and the public. For exam-
ple, the curtailment of loans to buyers ensures that no buyer will have an
undue advantage during the bidding. It also means that consignors may
not receive as much for their works as they would have received if the
bidders were financed by the auctioneer.
The "core legal concept" of an agency relationship implies a rela-
tionship "in which the principal retains the power to control and direct
the activities of the agent. Typically, the principal sets the ultimate ob-
jective and general strategy for the agent to pursue, occasionally specifies
details of the agent's behavior, and stands ready to countermand specific
acts of the agent."'"I
Modern consignors of art have very little control over the actions of
their auctioneer agents. Virtually the only power they retain is that of
withdrawing their work before auction and setting the amount of the
reserve (usually that suggested by the auctioneer). Each auctioneer
serves thousands of consignors each year, and it would be absurd to be-
lieve that each consignor is represented with the same "diligence, zeal,
and disinterested exertion."52 This agent is huge, powerful, and far more
knowledgeable than most of its principals in the area of the agency. The
51. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985).
52. Wadsworth v. Adams, 138 U.S. 380, 389 (1892). For example, consider the agent's
duty to "'use his best efforts to promote the principal's product.'" Cristallina v. Christie,
Manson & Woods, Int'l, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 284, 293, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 172 (1986) (quoting
Griffin & Evans Cosmetic Mktg. v. Madeline Mono, Ltd., 73 A.D.2d 957, 424 N.Y.S.2d 269
(1980) (citing Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville v. Hayden Pub. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 330
N.Y.S.2d 329, 281 N.E.2d 142 (1972))). A typical consignor is given a Sotheby's consignment
form which notes that "[items illustrated in catalogues generally attract more interest from
buyers and frequently draw absentee bids.... Recommendations for illustrations are made by
the experts after examining property. Black and white catalogue illustrations are charged at
$100 per full page .... " SOTHEBY'S CONSIGNMENT SERVICES INFORMATION (1986), re-
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agent is not even a person, but a multi-national corporation.5" Art auc-
tion houses and their consignors simply do not fit traditional assumptions
about agents and principals.
Professor Robert Clark argues that principles of agency law should
no longer be applied to modem corporate actors. In his view, corpora-
tions have outgrown the "face to face" nature of agency, and have be-
come governed by a body of complex rules and laws which often
incorporate agency principles, but do not entirely adopt them.54 Simi-
larly, the auction industry would be well served by abandoning some of
the agency rules which have hindered it.
The proposed set of auctioneer rules in Part VI is based on seven
basic assumptions about the auction process in modem society. It does
not attempt to apply the individual rules of a pre-existing legal doctrine
to the unique auction context. In so avoiding, it seeks to remain truer to
the popular vision of an "ideal" auction process.
III
The Auctioneer's Duty to the Buyer
The auctioneer's agency duty to the buyer has traditionally been
considered subordinate to that owed to the seller. 5 Courts and commen-
tators seldom mention fiduciary obligations or duties of disclosure to the
buyers of goods at auction.
Buyers suffer from having less choice about entering the auction
market than sellers. In a market for unique objects, the potential pur-
chaser must deal in the market the seller has chosen. If that market is an
auction house, then the buyer is subject to the vagaries of auction prac-
tice whether he likes them or not. Sellers, on the other hand, enjoy more
freedom. They may consign their unique works to an auctioneer, sell
through a dealer, or conduct a sale on their own. Because buyers are
thus channeled into the auction arena, they may deserve some measure of
protection beyond that of sellers.
printed in ART LAW, supra note 3, at 248 [hereinafter SOTHEBY'S CONSIGNMENT AGREE-
MENT].
Important clients, on the other hand, with important works to sell are promised much
advertising free of charge. Note Christie's assurance to the owner of eight Impressionist paint-
ings that the advertising and promotion for his sale would be "as spectacular as possible."
McGill, supra note 10, at C20, col. 3 (regarding the Cristallina case).
53. Sotheby's has 71 offices in 27 countries and employs more than 1,400 employees. It
became a publicly held corporation in May, 1988. Christie's has been trading on the London
stock exchange since 1973. As of 1988, it had 1,200 employees at 77 offices in 26 countries.
See Lee, supra note 14, at 68.
54. See Clark, supra note 51, at 56-60.
55. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Auctions and Auctioneers § 55 (1986).
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Moreover, the auctioneer's agency duty to the seller is often coinci-
dent with the auctioneer's own best interest. Both are concerned with
receiving the highest prices on as many works as possible. The buyer, on
the other hand, is concerned with precisely the opposite: paying the low-
est possible price. These two opposing tendencies cause the auction pro-
cess to work by reaching an optimal price between their limits.
Naturally, the auctioneer will desire to operate in his own best interest,
contrary to his optimizing function stated by Assumption 1 (optimal
price). As a result, the buyer may be short-changed by the auction pro-
cess. Assumption lb (ceiling price) responds to this threat, and recog-
nizes that the buyer should receive legal protection against auctioneer
misconduct.
The earliest buyer protections included restrictions on the conduct
of auctions, such as the prohibition against by-bidding,56 and the limited
agency of auctioneers to buyers. Today, they include sellers' warranties
of title and authenticity, obligations of disclosure, and post-auction re-
porting. These protections, when taken together, form a substantial body
of legal rights. Because bidder protections have arisen mainly from the
basic assumptions about the auction process, many of them are retained
in the set of proposed rules of auctioneer conduct set forth in Part VI.
A. Double Agency
The first attempt at protecting bidders at an auction arose as an ex-
tension of agency law. Until the fall of the hammer signifying the com-
pletion of an auction sale, the auctioneer is exclusively the agent of the
consignor. Once the hammer falls, however, the auctioneer becomes an
agent of the buyer as well.57 This double allegiance to parties with ap-
parently adverse and divergent interests is one of the most unusual as-
pects of auction law.
Once the auctioneer becomes an agent of the buyer, he can no longer
act adversely to the buyer's interests. For example, the auctioneer can
not re-open the bidding and buy the property once the hammer has fallen
on the buyer's lot.5" As agent to the buyer, the auctioneer theoretically
owes the buyer duties of obedience, diligence, accounting, and fiduciary
loyalty, just as he owes the seller. Courts, however, have reconciled these
possibly conflicting duties by treating the auctioneer's duty to the buyer
as more restricted than that owed the seller. Some courts have limited
56. This practice, detailed infra at notes 60-63 and accompanying text, involves the enter-
ing of fictitious bids by the auctioneer in order to inflate the prices of the lots sold.
57. See 7A C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 5 (1980).
58. See Holston v. Pennington, 225 Va. 551, 557-58, 304 S.E.2d 287, 290-91 (1983).
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the auctioneer's agency duty to the buyer to representing him in drawing
up the sale memorandum and overseeing the transfer of goods to him.59
B. Restrictions on By-Bidding
Assumption lb (ceiling price) demonstrates the general public dis-
like of any practice that deceives. The ideal view of the auction process is
one in which "each bid is an independent, bona fide offer by a person
willing to purchase the item at the bid price, and bids are not entered on
behalf of a consignor (or other person) to raise artificially the prices at
which the item will be sold."'
Among the "deceptive" techniques forbidden the auctioneer is the
practice of "by-bidding," or entering fictitious bids to continue the up-
ward spiral of prices on an object. This practice, also termed bidding "off
the chandelier, .... off the wall," or "out of the air," conflicts with As-
sumption lb (ceiling price). It deceives bidders into thinking that others
are vigorously competing for the same goods, inducing them to bid
higher. The Supreme Court has roundly condemned by-bidding, stating
that it "deceives, and involves a falsehood, and is, therefore, bad."6 The
buyer is said to have been bidding "against a man of straw falsely set up
by the auctioneer."62 Contracts induced after by-bidding are void or
voidable by the buyer.63
59. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Auctions and Auctioneers § 55 (1986).
60. ART LAW, supra note 3, at 203.
61. Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 134, 154 (1850).
62. Id. at 156. Although the courts claim that by-bidding subverts the auction process, as
such, it may be nothing more than a mechanism for shifting a benefit from seller to buyer.
Instead of the highest price which a bidder is willing to pay, the seller receives only one incre-
ment above the next-highest bidder's maximum bid. In some cases, the difference between the
two amounts may be significant.
By-bidding, when implemented accurately, is a mechanism for near-perfect pricing of
goods. For example, A will pay up to $10,000 for a painting, while B will only pay $5,000.
Without by-bidding, A will get the painting for $5,100, at a personal savings of $4,900. With
accurate by-bidding, A would pay $10,000 for the painting, giving the extra $4,900 to the
seller. It would seem that the auctioneer, in pursuing its duty to maximize the profit to the
seller, would be well-served by by-bidding. The blanket prohibition of by-bids implies that
auctioneers owe a greater duty toward pre-sale buyers than would otherwise be admitted. By
bids, however, are called "dishonest" and subversive of the auction process. That view of the
auction process is clearly one which favors buyers over sellers.
63. See 7A C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 15 (1980); see also U.C.C. § 2-328(4) (1978)
("[i]f the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's behalf ... the buyer may at his
option avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of the last good faith bid.").
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C. Warranties
1. Warranty of Title
In addition to agency principles, rules of warranty impose duties on
auctioneers. Section 2-312 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides
that in a contract for the sale of goods, the seller warrants that the title
conveyed is good. If a seller fails to give good title, the contract for sale
can generally be voided by the buyer. Because the contract for sale is
usually between buyer and seller, the auctioneer, acting only as an agent
to both parties, is generally not liable for defects in the title of goods
conveyed.
When an auctioneer fails to disclose the identity of the principal
whose goods he is selling, however, the auctioneer becomes liable to the
buyer under the warranty of title." This liability attaches even if the
auctioneer acts in good faith or did not know of the title defect.65 The
rationale for such liability is grounded in protection for the buyer while
maintaining confidentiality in the agency relationship. With both an un-
disclosed seller and his agent immune to suit, the buyer would have no
recourse if he received goods with defective title. Holding the auctioneer
liable shifts the burden of the defective title away from the buyer. The
auctioneer is held liable rather than the undisclosed seller in order to
preserve the principal's confidentiality in the agency relationship.
The warranty of title may be avoided in a number of ways. First, it
may be specifically disclaimed in the contract language.66 Second, it may
be vitiated by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
the seller or auctioneer does not claim to pass valid title.67 Third, an
auctioneer may often avoid liability under the warranty simply by dis-
closing the name of the principal.6"
2. Warranty of Merchantability
An auctioneer is generally not liable for the condition of the goods
he sells on consignment. If goods are advertised for sale "as is," then any
claim the buyer has arising from the non-conformity of the goods must
be brought against the seller, not the auctioneer. Courts have held that
64. See, e.g., Masoud v. Ban Credit Serv. Agency, 128 Misc. 2d 642, 643, 494 N.Y.S.2d
598, 600 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493
S.W.2d 385, 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
65. See United States v. Holmes & Robinson, 575 F. Supp. 30, 31 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
66. See U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (1978).
67. Id. However, the mere knowledge that a buyer is purchasing goods at an auction
from an auctioneer is not enough to show that he knew valid title was not warranted. See
Universal C.I. T Credit Corp., 493 S.W.2d at 390.
68. See Universal C.L T. Credit Corp., 493 S.W.2d at 390.
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an auctioneer has no duty to inspect or service "as is" goods, or to re-
quire the seller to do so.
69
An auctioneer can be held liable for defective goods, however, if he
makes some express claim as to their quality or condition independent of
the claims of the seller. For example, an auctioneer who pledges his own
responsibility for goods or makes a claim as to their quality during the
auction becomes liable for them if they do not conform.70 Likewise,
claims which appear in an auctioneer's advertising or catalogs can often
be interpreted as express warranties. The auctioneer has an affirmative
duty to ascertain that the information contained in its sales catalog and
announcements is accurate and comprehensive.71 Some courts have also
held that an auctioneer can be held liable for breach of the implied war-
ranty of fitness when the seller is undisclosed.72
Provenance and authenticity are included in the condition of goods
sold by an art auctioneer. Although not physical features, these attrib-
utes of a work are often essential to their value. In many cases, the war-
ranty of merchantability covers the provenance and authenticity, as well
as the physical condition of art works.73
The historical position of auctioneers with regard to warranty poli-
cies has been one of strict disclaimer and caveat emptor. Sotheby's tradi-
tional Conditions of Sale provided that, "All lots are sold as shown with
all faults, imperfections, and errors of description ... [Sotheby's is] not
responsible for errors of description or for genuineness or authenticity of
any lot ... Messrs. Sotheby make no warranty whatever. '' 74
69. See Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265, 1273 (E.D. Ky.. 1989) (no
duty for auctioneer to examine horse for internal defects prior to sale when horse was sold "as
is"); see also Brejcha v. Wilson Machinery, Inc., 160 Cal. App. 3d 630, 641, 206 Cal. Rptr.
688, 695 (1984).
70. Compare Edwin Bender & Sons v. Ericson Livestock Comm'n, 228 Neb. 157, 167, 421
N.W.2d 766, 772 (1988) (During the auction, a farmer asked the auctioneer whether certain
heifers were "open," or not with calf. The auctioneer assured him that they were open when,
in fact, a significant portion of them were pregnant. The auctioneer was liable for the non-
conforming goods.) with Pell City Wood, Inc. v. Forke Bros. Auctioneers, Inc., 474 So. 2d
694, 695 (Ala. 1985) (Although auctioneer claimed that trucks were in good condition and
ready to work, such statements were mere puffing, expressive of the auctioneer's opinion, not a
warranty.).
71. See Cohen, 712 F. Supp. at 1273; Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703
S.W.2d 885, 889-90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, Ill
Wash. 2d 396, 404-05, 759 P.2d 418, 422 (1988).
72. See Goltz v. Humboldt Livestock Auction, Inc., 255 Iowa 1384, 1392, 125 N.W.2d
773, 777 (1964) (auctioneer is treated as seller when principal is undisclosed).
73. See, e.g., Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 1081-82, 325 N.Y.S.2d
576, 581-82 (Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 80-81, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (1974) (Auc-
tioneer was sued for misattribution of a Dufy painting, but found not liable.).
74. ART LAW, supra note 3, at 195 (conditions of sale for Sotheby's London showroom in
the 1960s).
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Until recently, such disclaimers were considered to be binding on all
parties. With the adoption of Article 12-D (now Article 13) of the New
York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law in 1966, however, doubt was cast on
the effectiveness of such broad disclaimers. 7" Article 12-D provided that
giving a buyer of a work of fine art a certificate of authenticity amounted
to an express warranty of the material facts of the certificate.76 The
lower court decision in Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. 77 further
buttressed the buyers' position against auctioneers. That decision, re-
versed on appeal, held that the auctioneer's superior bargaining position
obligated it to disclaim only in the clearest and most emphatic
language.78
That decision, among other factors, influenced Sotheby's, and later
Christie's, to alter their warranty policies. In 1973, Sotheby's introduced
a new authenticity policy for its New York sales. It automatically ex-
tended a five year guarantee of authorship for post-1869 works; and of-
fered a five year guarantee that pre-1870 works were not counterfeits. 79
Today, both Sotheby's and Christie's warranty policies retain this form.
Warranty rules create a presumption of deception on the party held
liable. When a seller is held liable under a warranty, he is responsible for
a condition of the goods about which the buyer was not aware. Whether
the condition relates to the title or condition of the goods, the buyer is
deemed to be cheated through a lack of information about his purchase.
When a warranty is imposed on the seller, or he is prevented from dis-
claiming one, the cost of that misinformation is shifted away from the
buyer as the deceived party. This aversion to deception is incorporated
in our assumptions about the auction process. The perceived need for
full disclosure (Assumption 4: disclosure) and the auctioneer's honesty
(Assumption lb: ceiling price) support the enforcement of strict war-
ranty rules. Sotheby's and Christie's new warranty policies reflect these
assumptions.
D. Obligations of Disclosure
Various doctrines govern the obligations of auctioneers to reveal in-
formation to buyers and potential buyers. As discussed above, rules of
warranty govern an auctioneer's liability for facts relating to the title and
75. Id. at 97-99 and 193.
76. Id.
77. 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351
N.Y.S.2d 911 (1974).
78. Weisz, 67 Misc. 2d at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
79. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 195.
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condition of goods. Other laws govern an auctioneer's duty to disclose
facts about its sales and auctions.
For example, the New York City Consumer Code requires an auc-
tioneer to state immediately after striking down a lot whether that lot
was sold to a purchaser, or bought in for the owner."0 Such a require-
ment presumably allows buyers to gauge the demand for works similar to
those they plan to bid on, further refining the price optimization process
(Assumption 1: optimal price). To assist buyers before auction, the New
York Consumer Code also requires auctioneers to disclose in their sales
catalogs whether lots are subject to reserves, what their loan policies are,
and whether guaranteed prices are to be used.8'
Post-auction reporting is also subject to regulation under consumer
protection and fraud statutes. Auctioneers generally issue lists of works
sold and their prices after each auction. The New York Administrative
Code imposes criminal penalties for fraudulent announcements of this
information. 2 Such sanctions were imposed on Christie's after it issued
a false press release in connection with the Cristallina case. The auction-
eer reported that three, instead of only one, of the principal's Impression-
ist paintings were sold at auction. The New York City Consumer Affairs
Department fined Christie's $80,000 and suspended the licenses of the
Christie's officials responsible for the announcement.8
3
IV
The Auctioneer's Duty to the Public
Auctioneers have always, in some sense, been invested with a public
function. Courts in a few early cases recognized this status, 4 but it did
not become widely acknowledged until recently.' Today, many courts
have shifted their views from auctioneers as being mere private agents of
buyers and sellers to being actors for the public. Even disputes over an
80. See White, Putting Your Possessions on the Block, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1987, § 3, at
11, col. 3.
81. See Hughes, SOLD, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 60, 63.
82. N.Y CODE, supra note 15.
83. See Cristallina v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Int'l, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 284, 295-96, 502
N.Y.S.2d 165, 173 (1986).
84. See, e.g., Biddies, Inc. v. Enright, 239 N.Y. 354, 365, 146 N.E. 625, 629 (1925) ("the
business of an auctioneer ... has always been affected by a public interest and subject to
legislative restriction"); Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 134, 154 (1850) ("[A]ny fraud by
auctioneers is more dangerous than by owners themselves. The sales through the former ex-
tend to many millions annually, and are distributed through the whole country ... ").
85. See, e.g., Mizan Arabians v. Pyramid Soc'y, 821 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1987) (The
conduct of a horse auctioneer was viewed with strict scrutiny in light of its obligation to main-
tain "the integrity of [Kentucky's] leading industry.").
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auctioneer's misrepresentations about specific goods, once thought to be
strictly private disputes, have been held to affect "the public interest."1
8 6
A. Art Auction Houses as Public Institutions
The major art auction houses have, to some extent, adopted this
public role voluntarily. Christie's and Sotheby's, for example, have often
been compared to public museums. They host scholarly seminars, take
their collections on tour, lend works to other institutions, print exhibi-
tion-quality catalogs, provide lectures and art appreciation classes, and,
most of all, make an effort to attract tourists who have no intention of
buying art. 87 The auction houses have even at times acted as public pro-
tectors of the arts. Most notable is Christie's and Sotheby's recent offer
to underwrite a one million dollar reward for the return of stolen paint-
ings to the Elizabeth Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston."8
Another contributor to the "public institution" image of the art auc-
tion house has been its changing clientele. Over the past thirty years, the
customer base of art auctioneers has shifted from one predominantly
made up of art dealers and experts to one largely made up of the general
public. 9 These customers were naturally less familiar with auction pro-
cedures and art than the dealers and experts. As a result, many per-
ceived a need for certain procedural safeguards in the auction process.
Notions of public responsibility and accountability thus arose in the art
auction context.
Today, the art auctioneer's duties extend well beyond the original
agency duty to the consignor and to the bidder. The auctioneer's new
duties are rooted in the basic assumptions about overall fairness in the
auction process and the desire to create a "level playing field" in the
auction market.
B. Disclosure Requirements
Such concerns can be seen in consumer protection legislation regu-
lating auctioneers' disclosures. Under the Consumer Affairs Code of
New York City, for example, art auctioneers are held to fairly rigid stan-
dards of truthfulness in both pre- and post-auction reporting and adver-
tising. They are required to reveal when "insiders" will be bidding on
lots, when guarantees and reserve prices are in effect, and what their poli-
86. Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 406-07, 759 P.2d 418,
423 (1988).
87. See Nuding, The Art Market: Salesroom Practice, APOLLO, July 1988, at 39-40.
88. See Letters, TIME, Apr. 23, 1990, at 10 (The auctioneers agreed to underwrite the
reward after being approached by officials from the museum.).
89. See Lee, supra note 14, at 68.
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cies are regarding loans.9 After an auction, they are restrained from the
once-common practice of publishing private post-auction sales as auction
sales and from reporting false "record" prices to the press.9"
In the consumer protection context, the assumption that auction in-
formation should be truthful (Assumption 4: disclosure) overrides many
other concerns. For example, when Christie's officials reported that
three instead of only one of the eight Cristallina paintings were sold, they
offered a number of justifications for their actions. First, the misrepre-
sentation benefitted Christie's by showing a more successful sale. Sec-
ond, it benefitted the owner of the paintings, who would otherwise have
had more difficulty selling the rest of the "burned" works. Third, the
misrepresentation hurt no third parties. Fourth, the auctioneer argued
that the misrepresentation would "protect the art market from becoming
commercially depressed."92 These rationales were, however, overshad-
owed by the auctioneer's responsibility to the public and the overwhelm-
ing assumption about the importance of truthful disclosure.
The rationale behind disclosure requirements is the creation of a
"purer" auction market in which buyer confidence is high and no undue
advantages are given to any one customer. Similarly, concerns about
tilted playing fields have led to criticism of possible "insider trading" at
the major auction houses. Insiders at auction houses conceivably have
access to information regarding guaranteed prices, the amounts of secret
reserves, and unpublicized appraisals. Possession of this kind of informa-
tion clearly confers a benefit to the insider-bidder. As recently as 1985,
spokespersons for Christie's and Sotheby's confirmed that members of
their boards of directors regularly bid on and purchased works at auc-
tion.9" This practice, investigated by the New York Department of Con-
sumer Affairs in 1985, has led to new requirements that auctioneers
disclose when auction house employees and other insiders bid at sales.94
90. See White, supra note 80, § 3, at 11, col. 1.
91. This practice was sharply criticized when Sotheby's reported a record auction sale
price for a Guarnerius violin (£115,800), only to retract its statement three weeks later and
admit that the violin was sold privately for only £99,000. See McGill, supra note 10, at Al,
col. 4.
92. ART LAW, supra note 3, at 268.
93. See McGill, supra note 10, at C20, col. 1.
94. See N.Y. CODE, supra note 15, at Reg. III, § 21; see also McGill, Proposed Auction
Rules Would Reveal No-Sales, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1986, at C17, col. 2.
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V
The Practices of Art Auctioneers: Conflicts with the
Basic Assumptions?
Some of the practices of the two major art auction houses, Christie's
and Sotheby's, have recently come under attack. Commentators, includ-
ing associations of art dealers, have repeatedly criticized the auctioneers'
practices of charging buyer's premiums, making loans secured by works
for sale to bidders, keeping reserve prices secret, and guaranteeing con-
signors minimum prices by buying works for their own account. None of
these practices are presently regulated by law, although there is continu-
ing pressure on the New York Department of Consumer Affairs to regu-
late auctioneers more heavily."
This section examines these controversial practices in light of our
basic assumptions about the auction process and the auctioneer's duties
described above. This examination will serve as a basis for the recom-
mendations for auction regulation proposed in Part VI.
A. Buyer's Premiums
In 1975, Sotheby's and Christie's began to charge a ten percent com-
mission to buyers of works purchased at auction. This charge allowed
the auctioneers to meet their increasing costs without driving consignors
away with higher seller's commissions.96 Buyer's premiums have been
repeatedly criticized and challenged in both Great Britain and the United
States.97 However, they have withstood all legal challenges so far.
It is unclear whether the buyer's premium is intended to reflect pay-
ment for a service offered, or whether it is merely an "entrance fee" for
the auction.9" On either account, it seems fair. It has been argued that
the auctioneer provides no service to the buyer, rendering the premium
unconscionable.99 However, the buyer receives a number of services
from the auctioneer including use of the auction space, the conduct of an
organized sale, post-sale reporting of the buyer's purchase, the auction-
95. See Hughes, supra note 81, at 62-63.
96. Seller's commissions at both Sotheby's and Christie's are 20% of the sale price for lots
sold for under $1000, 15% for lots sold between $1000 and $5000, and 10% for lots sold for
$5000 or more. Minimum seller's commissions are $100 per lot at Sotheby's, and $75 per lot
at Christie's. See R. LERNER & J. BRESSLER, supra note 1, at 160.
97. In 1979, the Society of London Art Dealers and the British Antique Dealers Associa-
tion brought an unsuccessful antitrust suit against Sotheby's and Christie's. In 1982, the Art
Dealer's Association filed a complaint with the New York Department of Consumer Affairs,
but was rejected. Legislation seeking to ban the buyer's premium was introduced in England
in 1983, but did not pass. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 200-01.
98. Nuding, supra note 87, at 39.
99. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 200.
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eer's services as an expert and appraiser, and the auctioneer's services as
an agent in concluding and formalizing the sale.
No basic assumption about the auction process is violated by the
buyer's premium. It seems, in fact, to be a logical implementation of
Assumption lc (commission), and still costs buyers less than the fifty to
one hundred percent mark-ups charged by art dealers."o
B. Buyer's Loans
Sotheby's recently announced that it was ending its policy of "sell-
ing art on margin."' ' This announcement was primarily in response to
Sotheby's highly criticized 1987 loan transaction which enabled financier
Alan Bond to purchase Van Gogh's Irises for $53.9 million. Unknown to
other bidders, Bond had arranged an open-ended loan with the financial
services division of Sotheby's for half the final hammer-price of the
work.' 0 2 Unfortunately for the auction house, Bond was unable to make
his loan payments on schedule. Sotheby's recovered the painting, which
stood as collateral for the loan, and plans to sell it again. 03
Contrary to the general tone of Sotheby's announcement, the auc-
tion house still plans to offer its clients a variety of significant financial
services. Sotheby's loan portfolio and assets represented by collectibles
are already considerable."o The only service Sotheby's plans to curtail is
the lending of funds secured by property the borrower plans to buy at
auction. Among the services it will continue are: (1) lending collectors
up to fifty percent of the appraised value of works owned for at least
ninety days, (2) lending consignors up to fifty percent of the low estimate
of works placed for sale with the auction house, and (3) lending to buy-
ers against works other than the works for sale at auction.105
Sotheby's is not the only institution that lends money with art as
collateral. Both Citibank and Chase Manhattan Bank do so on a far
larger scale and offer lower rates to art collectors and purchasers."°
The lending of money to prospective buyers does not adversely af-
fect the auctioneer's duty to its principal. On the contrary, it ensures the
100. See S. NAIFEH, supra note 4.
101. Reif, Sotheby's is Ending its Art Sales on Margin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at Al,
col. 2.
102. Hughes, The Anatomy of a Deal, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 66.
103. See id.
104. By September, 1989, Sotheby's loan portfolio reached $254 million. See Brown, We
are Going to See a $100 Million Painting, FORBES, Feb. 5, 1990, at 170. In 1988, the auction
house's net assets were reported at $600 million, $450 million of which were receivables in-
cluding loans to buyers, advances to sellers, loans to collectors, and money due from buyers.
See Wechsler, Is the Art Market Ready for Mountain Tortoise?, FORBES, Mar. 19, 1990, at 44.
105. See Brown, supra note 104, at 170.
106. Id.
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principal a higher price on its works. Despite Alan Bond's financial diffi-
culties, the previous owner of Irises, John Payson, has been paid in full
by Sotheby's. 10 7  The primary risk-taker on a buyer loan is the
auctioneer.
One leading case holds that the extension of credit to a bidder by an
auctioneer is outside the ordinary scope of the auctioneer's agency du-
ties. 108 In that case, however, the court permitted the auctioneer to ex-
tend credit because the particular auctioneer's relationship to the
consignor was broader than an ordinary agency relationship. The factors
which caused the court to consider the relationship as extending beyond
the ordinary agency relationship included the auctioneer's assumption of
full control of the property (auto parts), the auctioneer's assortment and
preparation of the property for auction, and his guarantee to the buyers
of the quality of the property."t° These factors sway in favor of the ex-
pansion of an art auctioneer's authority to extend credit to its customers.
Critics of the Sotheby's loans have made two arguments against the
loan practice. Both arguments rely not on principles of agency law, but
on notions of public benefit and fairness. The fact that Sotheby's recently
agreed to cease at least one conspicuous loan policy indicates its general
willingness to consider public and consumer duties in its profit
calculus."1 o
The first argument against Sotheby's notes the possible unfairness to
other bidders on the same lot as the auctioneer-financed bidder. This
argument is responsive to Assumption 3: the auctioneer should give no
bidder an unfair advantage. The secret extension of credit to one or more
bidders puts bidders who may not be able to bid as high at, a
disadvantage.
Despite this reasoning, there is no explicit agency duty which re-
quires an auctioneer to treat all buyers alike. The auctioneer's fiduciary
duty to the buyer does not arise until the fall of the hammer. The under-
bidder in an auction pays nothing, although he loses the opportunity to
buy the work. This perceived unfairness, although regrettable, is the
same as that experienced when a bidder financed by a bank or personal
107. Hughes, supra note 102, at 66; Reif, supra note 101, at C17, col. 4.
108. McKey v. Erbes, 187 Iowa 609, 614-15, 174 N.W. 372, 374 (1919).
109. Id. at 614, 174 N.W. at 374.
110. Skeptics might argue that Sotheby's had two, more mercenary, reasons for aban-
doning its loan policy. First, the announcement served as a good public relations gesture in the
face of public outcry about Irises; and second, that Sotheby's found such loans to be unprofita-
ble. Though such arguments are plausible, they are not wholly convincing. Sotheby's contin-
ues many practices which are roundly condemned, such as secret reserves and buyer's
premiums. There is also no evidence that it failed to profit from its previous loans. Even the
loan to Alan Bond promises to be more than made up by the resale of Irises.
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wealth outbids another bidder. The fact that the auctioneer is the lender
does not bias the auction in any more significant way.
The second complaint about the Sotheby's loans is that they artifi-
cially inflate art prices.' Bidders can bid much higher for art, risking
only the return of their purchase if they default. The inflation of art
prices is, however, generally good for consignors and auctioneers. The
losers in an inflated market are buyers and potential buyers to whom the
auctioneer owes no legal duty.
Assumption 3 (no unfair advantage) responds to biases created in
the auction procedure by the auctioneer. It does not respond to the eco-
nomic inequalities among bidders. The most objectionable features of
Sotheby's loan to Alan Bond were its secrecy and its exclusivity. Had the
availability of loans for the purchase of Irises been announced before the
auction, and had the loan policy been open to all buyers with the requi-
site credit qualifications, then Mr. Bond would have had no unfair ad-
vantage. If loans were available to all qualified bidders, then all bidders
would have an equal defense against the resulting inflated prices.
C. Secret Reserves
One of the most criticized practices of art auction houses concerns
the secret reserve prices below which a work will be "bought in" by the
auctioneer and returned, unsold, to its owner. The reserve price arises
from Assumption 2 (floor price) about the auction process. As discussed
earlier, it seems wrong to force the owner of a work to part with it for
less than the lowest price he is willing to receive. At issue is not the
validity of reserve prices, however, but merely the secrecy of reserve
prices.
Criticism of the secret reserve comes from art dealers, consumer ad-
vocates, and the press who, although acknowledging the need for seller
protection, argue that the reserve prices should be made public before or
during the auction. Two aspects of the secret reserve procedure have
been criticized as being subversive of the auction process. The first is the
general secrecy of the reserve price. The second is the fictitious bidding
auctioneers must do in order to push the price of an item above the re-
serve price.12
111. Reif, supra note 101, at C17, col. 4.
112. McGill, supra note 10, at C20, col. 3. Sotheby's openly reserves the right to enter
protective bids for the seller in its conditions of sale. See SOTHEBY'S CONSIGNMENT AGREE-
MENT, supra note 52, at 236-37 ("Each lot of the property will be offered subject to a reserve";
"all bids to protect your reserves will be made by us.").
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1. Arguments for Secrecy
Confidentiality, though part of an agent's duty to his principal, and
though expected in many professional relationships, has not traditionally
been a basic aspect of the auction process in America. Therefore, propo-
nents of secrecy have had to link their arguments for secrecy to more
generally valued basic assumptions about the auction process.
a. Protecting the Seller from Buyer "Rings"
The traditional reason for maintaining the secrecy of reserve prices
is the protection of sellers from collusive "rings" of buyers, usually un-
scrupulous art dealers. If the minimum price a seller would take for a
work were generally known, buyers could conspire to bid no higher than
that minimum price. They could then secretly auction the work among
themselves, keeping the profit which would otherwise have gone to the
auction house and seller.I1 3 Although it is questionable whether bidding
conspiracies among buyers would be greater today absent secret reserves,
auctioneers continue to maintain that secrecy is necessary to protect the
sellers of art against such conspiracies. As stated by John Marion, for-
mer President of Sotheby's, "the only protection [the sellers] have is that
little bit of mystery."' 14
b. Building up Excitement in the Auction
Although still mentioned, protection against buyer rings has become
a secondary concern for those favoring secrecy of reserves. Secrecy pro-
ponents, generally represented by the auction houses, cite two other rea-
sons for maintaining the secrecy of reserve prices. First, they claim that
bidding should start low in order to build up drama and excitement in
the auction process. They rely in great part on Assumption 1 about the
auction process (optimal price). If bidding began at the relatively high
reserve price, it might not develop the momentum needed to achieve an
optimal price. Starting the bidding at a high price can, in the words of
113. For example, suppose five buyers were considering purchasing a painting whose re-
serve price was $5,000. Suppose further that Buyer A were willing to pay up to $9,000 for the
painting, and Buyers B, C, D, and E were willing to pay less. Buyer A could buy the painting
for $5,000 without the risk of competing bids driving the price above the reserve. Then, Buyer
A could pay each of the others up to $ 1,000 for their cooperation. Buyer A will have the
painting at no more than $9,000; Buyers B, C, D, and E will each have a small profit; and the
seller will be cheated out of a potential $4,000 profit.
Keeping the reserve secret, on the other hand, would make the plotters unsure of the
minimum price and unable to bid low for the work without the risk of losing it to the owner.
See, e.g., ART LAW, supra note 3, at 186.
114. McGill, supra note 10, at C20, col. 3.
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one commentator, create "a roomful of silence," rather than a lively
round of bidding."1 5
c. Conformity with International Practices
A second, and more recent, rationale for keeping reserves secret in
New York, in particular, is maintenance of New York as a major world
center for art sales. If secret reserves were abolished in New York, sell-
ers might take their business to Geneva or London, where secrecy is still
standard. 16
2. Arguments for Disclosure
a. Bidding Off the Chandelier
Opponents of secret reserves, led by the Art Dealers Association of
America, argue that secret reserves make a "sham" of the auction pro-
cess.117 Bidding which occurs below the reserve leads consumers to
think that a competitive auction is taking place when it is not. Buyers at
an auction have no way of knowing whether the bids being called by the
auctioneer should be attributed to a seller, a competitor in the room, an
absentee bidder placing bids by telephone, a prearranged "order" bid, the
auctioneer as a "by-bid," the auctioneer pushing a lot up to its reserve, or
the auctioneer bidding for its own account. The uncertainty imposed on
the auction participant, who may assume that all bids come from other
buyers, has been said to "border on deception."
118
This argument puts Assumption la (manage bidding) into direct
conflict with Assumption lb (ceiling price). Secrecy is needed to gener-
ate momentum in the bidding, but secrecy is also deceptive and confusing
to bidders. The proposed set of rules in Part VI attempts to reach a
compromise between these two assumptions. It provides that protective
bids may be entered only up to the reserve price, allowing bidding to gain
momentum below the reserve, while clearing the floor of extraneous bid-
ding when the bidding counts.
115. Greenspan, Regulating the Art Business, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1985, § 1, at 23, col. 5.
116. See White, Putting Your Possessions on the Block, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1987, § 3, at
11, col. 3.
117. See McGill, supra note 94, at C17, col. 3. The Art Dealers Association represents the
major group of merchants hurt by the recent success of art auction houses.
118. Nuding, supra note 87, at 35. Note that the entry of bids to protect a reserve does not
violate the auctioneer's duty not to enter by-bids. By-bids serve to escalate the price of a work
once bidding has begun. Protective bids do not cause any other bidder to overpay for a work
because the work would not be sold below the reserve price at all.
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b. Disappointed Expectations
Another consumer-oriented criticism addresses the disappointed ex-
pectations of buyers at the auction. Buyers may come from far away to
participate in an auction, only to be prevented from purchasing by pro-
hibitively high reserves." 9 However, auction houses claim that their
published presale estimates of prices always exceed the reserve on a
lot.120 If so, bidders would have at least some idea of their chances of
bidding successfully on any lot.
Moreover, recent consumer legislation in New York City has fur-
ther increased the information auctioneers must disclose regarding re-
serve prices. It requires auctioneers to state whether a reserve price
exists for each lot while allowing them to keep the actual reserve price
secret.'2' Of course, this requirement is a small concession by auction
houses since the Uniform Commercial Code already provides that all
auctions are presumed to be with reserve unless otherwise stated. 22
c. Efficient Pricing
The secrecy of reserves also hurts the efficiency of the auction mar-
ket. The establishment of a minimum price before the auction eliminates
the market as the determinant of the selling price of a work. Keeping
this price secret eliminates any chance for the seller to adjust the reserve
price based on adverse reaction to it. In other words, the seller may not
know that his secret reserve was too high until the work fails to sell at
auction. 
23
To eliminate some of this inefficiency, auctioneers have been known
to stretch the bounds of their "secrecy." In some instances, auctioneers
may advise selected buyers of the reserve's range, or whether a seller is
119. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 185.
120. See SOTHEBY'S CONSIGNMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 52, at 237 (Sotheby's
reserves are stated to be between 25 and 60% of the low pre-sale estimate and never in excess
of the high pre-sale estimate.) But see Cristallina v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Int'l, Inc., 117
A.D.2d 284, 288, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 169 (1986) (Christie's violated this policy, setting a re-
serve $300,000 higher than the high estimate for a painting.).
121. See NEW YORK CODE, supra note 15, at Reg. III, § 21. This notification of reserve
prices generally takes the form of a small dot or asterisk beside each item in the auctioneer's
catalog. See also McGill, supra note 10, at C20, col. 1.
122. See U.C.C. § 2-328 (1983) ("a sale [by auction] is with reserve unless the goods are in
explicit terms put up without reserve").
123. The failure to sell due to overly high reserves is not uncommon. See, e.g., Mullen v.
Starr, 537 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mo. 1982) aff'd, 696 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1982) cert denied, 461
U.S. 960 (1983) (auctioneer was not liable when seller placed too high a reserve on his horse);
McGill, supra note 10, at C20, col. 5 (J.M.W. Turner's Landscape with Walton Bridges, ham-
mered down for $1.65 million, failed to sell because the owners improvidently set the reserve
too high.).
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"greedy" or willing to settle on a lower price. They may also advise the
seller about what certain buyers are willing to pay for a work.' 24
This "tinkering" with the auction process generally favors rich or
prominent buyers personally known to the auctioneers. As a result, it
implicates Assumption 3 (no unfair advantage) and is generally
unethical.
D. Guaranteed Prices
Today, Sotheby's, Christie's, and a number of smaller auction
houses have begun to attract clients by guaranteeing minimum prices for
works they wish to auction. 25 For example, if a seller expects to receive
ten million dollars for his painting, the auctioneer may guarantee at least
eight million dollars for the work.'26 If no buyers bid up to the guaran-
teed price, the auction house itself buys the work and pays the seller eight
million dollars. Thus, the guarantee is like a "super reserve." Instead of
being assured that he will not have to part with his painting for less than
a certain reserve price, the seller is assured that he will receive a guaran-
teed sum regardless of the auction's outcome. Considering the many ill
effects of failing to sell a work at auction, such a guarantee would seem
enormously attractive to consignors.1
27
The major problem associated with an auctioneer's guarantee of a
minimum price for a work is the result that the auction houses end up
owning the works of art they are acting as agents to sell. In terms of the
fiduciary relationship governing auctioneers, this result is disfavored.
Although it is not impermissible for an auctioneer to purchase the goods
of his principal with the principal's consent, all such transactions are
124. Nuding, supra note 87, at 37.
125. Sotheby's has guaranteed prices since 1972. In 1989, it guaranteed over $150 million
to sellers, and has already announced a guarantee on the sale of the estate of Lydia Winston
Malbin, valued at over $60 million, scheduled for May, 1990. See Passell, Vincent Van Gogh,
Meet Adam Smith, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, § 2, at 12, col. 1.
Christie's has only recently announced its decision to guarantee prices, beginning with the
sale of the estate of Robert Lehman, also scheduled for May, 1990. The value of that estate
has been estimated between $40 and $60 million. See Reif, Christie's Reverses Stand on Price
Guarantees, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at C13, col. 1. Other auctioneers willing to extend
guarantees include Butterfield and Butterfield of San Francisco and Los Angeles; Habsburg,
Feldman of Geneva and New York; and William Doyle Galleries of New York. See id. at
C16, col. 1.
126. The commission which a seller pays for the privilege of having his price guaranteed is
in the range of 7% of the guarantee amount. See ART LAW, supra note 3, at 192.
127. Consider, for example, the fate of unsold works. They are usually returned to the
owner, often resulting in a loss of value. The object becomes "burned," or less likely to sell in
the near future. Absent a showing of negligence on the part of the auctioneer, the auctioneer is
not responsible for such intangible damages to the seller. See DeBruno v. Sotheby Parke
Bernet, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 3021, bench op. (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 1984).
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viewed with suspicion. 128 Sales to an auctioneer of his principal's goods
for a price lower than the fair market value of the goods sold are consid-
ered prima facie unfair.
129
When the auctioneer becomes a potential buyer of the goods he is
selling, an inevitable conflict of interest arises. Some commentators spec-
ulate that the issuance of high guarantees may encourage auctioneers to
over-publicize and overestimate the value of the guaranteed works in or-
der to avoid the expense of buying them. 130 Alternately, it is possible
that the prospect of paying a relatively low guarantee price for a poten-
tially "record-breaking" work would lead auctioneers to under-publicize
and underestimate the value of those works. In this way, they could later
sell the works at a great profit.
The latter scenario is supported by the nature of the guarantee price
itself. The guarantee will generally tend toward the low estimate of a
work's value. Its ostensible purpose is to ensure a minimum price for the
seller, not a high price. Thus, the actual sale value of a work will gener-
ally exceed its guarantee. Presently, auction houses are satisfied to guar-
antee works for less than their sale values (generally 50% of their
estimated value) and collect commissions on the sale. It will not escape
auctioneers' attention, however, that a more profitable scheme would
be to buy a work for the relatively low guarantee price, then resell it for
the higher market value. In such a situation, the auctioneer would profit
directly from the work's "appreciation," not merely from
commissions. 
131
Once auctioneers become investing buyers, their status as fiduciaries
of the seller is severely compromised. Sellers often depend on auction
house appraisers for valuations of their works. If it is in the interest of
the auctioneer to underestimate the value of a work, that interest directly
128. See supra Part II(D)(I) (auctioneer self dealing).
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 comment c (1984).
130. See Reif, supra note 125, at C16, col. 1-2.
131. For example, consider Sotheby's recent sale of the estate of John T. Dorrance, Jr. Id
Sotheby's guaranteed approximately $100 million to the owners of the collection of art and
antiques. Id. They sold for approximately $130 million. Id. Sotheby's probably collected the
following amounts:
7% guarantee fee $ 7 million
10% seller's commission $ 13 million
10% buyer's commission $ 13 million
Total $ 33 million
If, on the other hand, Sotheby's had bought the collection for the guarantee price of $100
million and later sold it for $130 million, it would have profited as follows:
7% guarantee fee $ 7 million
Appreciation $ 30 million
10% buyer's commission $ 13 million
Total $ 50 million
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conflicts with its duty to obtain the highest price for the seller. The duty
of diligence may be violated during the auction itself if the auctioneer,
even unconsciously, promotes with less vigor those items the auction
house has a possibility of owning. Likewise, an auctioneer who owns
works being sold at auction indirectly competes for bidders with the
other sellers at that auction, perhaps violating the fiduciary duty not to
compete with his principal.
Auction houses cannot become buyers of works while maintaining
fiduciary duties to sellers. 132 Therefore we should determine which of
these practices is most justified in light of the basic assumptions about the
auction process. The agency relationship may, as discussed above, be an
inappropriate doctrine for controlling the behavior of art auctioneers.
The extreme loyalty demanded by the fiduciary relationship does not
form a basic assumption about the auctioneer-consignor relationship.
Achieving the highest price for the consignor, however, is supported by
Assumptions 1 (optimal price) and la (manage bidding). If the auction-
eer is willing to pay the highest price for a work of art, then it works in
the seller's favor to let him buy it. Therefore, absent-any bad faith on the
auctioneer's part, allowing it to bid for and own works is not
problematic. 133
The effect of guaranteed prices on the art market as a whole is un-
certain. Auctioneers already compete to sell the most lucrative works
that come onto the market. It might be argued that guarantees are only
another service that extends the realm of healthy competition between
the auction houses. It is also possible, however, that the widespread use
of guarantees could inflate art prices considerably. Consider, for exam-
ple, the effect of Christie's and Sotheby's competition for a particularly
important consignment. Their negotiations with the seller could amount
to no less than a mini-auction among auctioneers, with the guarantee
price bid higher and higher to secure the consignment. The situation
would escalate if other auctioneers and dealers entered the competitive
arena. 1
34
132. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the stringent fiduciary duty).
133. A useful analogy is that of the modern investment bank. Investment banks trade
securities as brokers for clients to whom they owe duties of care and honesty. However, they
may also buy and sell on their own accounts. The securities market is highly regulated to
ensure against dishonest practices.
134. Art dealer William Acquavella, for example, offered a guarantee of $100 million for
the estate of John T. Dorrance, Jr., discussed supra note 131. Sotheby's only narrowly beat his




Proposed Rules for Regulating the Auction Industry
In light of the foregoing analysis of present auction practices and the
seven basic assumptions about the auction market, this author proposes
the following rules for the regulation of the auction industry:
1. Reserve prices may be agreed upon between the consignor and
auctioneer (satisfying Assumption 2: floor price) and may remain secret.
Secrecy of the reserve price should not disappoint buyers if it is always
below the auctioneer's low estimate published for each lot. Buyers will
know the range of prices and will only have to worry about losing to the
reserve if their "winning" bid is below the low estimate. With adequate
disclosure, the requirements of Assumption 4 (disclosure) are satisfied.
2. Auctioneers may enter by-bids only up to the reserve price. There
is little harm in allowing an auctioneer to "bid off the chandelier" while
bidding is still below the reserve price. If no bidder is willing to pay the
reserve or more, the work would not sell anyway. The auctioneer does
have a duty to excite bidding (Assumption la: manage bidding) to
achieve the highest price for his consignor.
However, once bidding attains the reserve price, the auctioneer
should not by-bid. Once there is a real chance that a bidder will be
bound by his bid, all bids should be real, or risk violating Assumption lb
(ceiling price).
3. The auction house may bid to purchase any lot. The auction
house may, in effect, guarantee prices for consignors. Ownership of
works by the auctioneer is not problematic, so long as its appraisal and
publicity for the works it buys are fair. With adequate disclosure of
guaranteed lots and works owned by the auctioneer, Assumption 4 (dis-
closure) is satisfied.
To permit this practice, the fiduciary duty regulating self-dealing by
the auctioneer must be relaxed in the way the duty for corporate direc-
tors was loosened in the 1960s.135
4. The auction house may not engage in any practice which favors
one bidder over another. This rule is based on Assumption 3 (no unfair
advantage) prohibiting the creation of a tilted playing field in the ideal
auction market.
The loan practices of auction houses are problematic only in that
they favor some bidders over others. If the auctioneer chooses to act as a
general lender, making lending decisions based on objective criteria and
135. See supra Part III(D)(1) (Corporate self-dealing transactions are currently allowed in
most states if "fair" or ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders.).
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offering such financial services to all customers, then Assumption 3 is
satisfied.
The auctioneer should not give potential buyers information about
upcoming sales, reserve amounts, or values which is not published or
available to all bidders. Similarly, auction house employees and other
insiders should not bid on works if they have any inside information
about the works or consignor.
5. The auctioneer must disclose all transactions pertaining to his
auctions truthfully and completely. This blanket rule embodies Assump-
tion 4 (disclosure). In addition to the disclosures presently required by
consumer protection law, other information of use to auction house cus-
tomers should be prominently disclosed.136
Current consumer protection and anti-fraud statutes already govern
many of these requirements. These rules have not, however, been recog-
nized as logically sound derivations from general principles yet. This
Article seeks to so treat them.
VII
Conclusion
The character of the art auction industry has changed dramatically
in recent years, and auction houses are faced with numerous choices for
the future. As the character of auction houses has changed, the tradi-
tional agency and sales rules governing auctions have become more and
more inadequate for regulating them.
To replace them, this Article looks to the basic assumptions under-
lying the auction process. These assumptions hold that auctions produce
fair prices for unique art objects. The auctioneer who conducts the auc-
tion must thus provide an unbiased forum in which the price of unique
art objects can be determined.
The current rules governing auctions and the current practices of
auction houses in some cases do not wholly embody these basic assump-
tions. Aspects of current auction practice relating to buyers' loans, secret
reserves, and guaranteed prices could be improved by paying closer at-
tention to basic assumptions about the auction process, and adhering less
rigidly to inadequate principles of agency and sales law. The proposed
.136. For example, information relating to clouds over title of works, doubts about authen-
ticity, liens on works, present ownership of paintings, independent appraisals of works, and the
status of intellectual property and moral rights attached to works would all be useful to poten-
tial buyers.
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rules for governing auctioneers presented here seek to link auctioneer
practice directly to the basic societal assumptions about the auction pro-
cess and its advantages.
